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4 problems in the round. But whatever their remit, ABIs were given bounded parameters: they were given relatively limited resources, to operate for specific periods of time, in pre-defined 'deprived' localities. Bearing in mind this plethora of initiatives, it is not surprising to see contrasting assessments of success. A government funded 1994 project provided a relatively favourable overview (Department of the Environment, 1994), whereas a 2002 overview perceived regeneration policy as being a 'failure' (Gripaios, 2002) . Whatever the merits of these assessments, the whole urban question was in any event to be given a marked re-orientation following the election of Blair's 'New Labour' government in 1997.
One key characteristic of urban policy in the period 1997 to 2010 was that it had more of a strategic 'feel' to it than had previously been the case. An Urban Task Force was established, whose report 'Towards an Urban Renaissance' (Urban Task Force, 1999) and the associated government White Paper (DETR, 2000b) , helped 'generate a sense of excitement' and an eagerness to see its recommendations implemented (House of Commons, 2000 xiii) . Moreover, even if 'city regions' were to be the main focus of attention during this period, that was not to deny the existence of deprived pockets within larger conurbations. In 1998 the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU), a central government agency, outlined a rationale for a National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal, the 'most concerted attack on area deprivation this country has ever seen' (SEU, 1998, 12) , one central 5 component of which was the New Deal for Communities (NDC) Programme.
The New Deal for Communities Programme: an overview
The NDC Programme, launched in 1998, was designed to 'help turn around the poorest neighbourhoods' (DETR, 1998, 1) , thus reducing 'the gaps between some of the poorest neighbourhoods and the rest of the country' (DETR, 2001, 2) . 39 NDC Partnerships established across England were to attack problems within areas each consisting of, on average, 9,800 people.
NDC Programme wide funding was to be about £2 billion, approximately £50 million to each of the 39 areas. The Programme's ten year horizon reflected the concern that previous ABIs had not been given enough time to instigate change. Each NDC was expected to achieve positive change in relation to six outcomes. As will be explored below, there is an important distinction here to be made across these six. Three were intended to improve these 39 'places': crime, the local community, and housing and the physical environment Three were to improve outcomes for people: education, health and worklessness. Taking an overview of the then emerging Programme in 2004 the National Audit Office suggested that: 'the NDC Programme marks a departure from previous area-based initiatives in terms of the significant level of funding involved (and) the length of the initiative' (NAO, 2004, 4) . NDC areas. The decision was therefore taken to carry out the household survey in comparator areas. These are located in the same local authorities as NDCs, but in non-adjacent wards in order to avoid potential spillover effects. The intention was that as far as possible these areas, of which there 8 were three for each NDC, would be as deprived as the 39 NDC areas. In total 2,014 completed questionnaires were obtained from respondents in comparator areas in 2002, 4,048 in 2004, 3,062 in 2006, and 3,100 in 2008. In addition some 297 people were interviewed in all four waves, and thus represent a 'comparator areas panel'. It has to be stressed that the comparator areas are not 'regeneration free controls'. They too will have benefited from trends which, in broad terms, have apparently led to improvements in many deprived areas throughout England (Tunstall and Coulter, 2006 Nevertheless, the depth of this evidence base across all NDC areas from a common base-line of 2002, provides an ideal opportunity through which to assess change for both areas and individuals, a theme of considerable importance not just for those interested in English urban policy, but also for those implementing and evaluating ABIs in other institutional contexts.
Changes for places and for people
As is discussed above, data allows for an exploration of change both to areas and also for residents who stayed in these areas, for that six year Table 2 provides an overview of the 11, of 36, core indicators which showed statistically significant net change over and above that occurring in the comparator areas.
All but two of these, both indicators of educational attainment, moved in an 'NDC-positive' fashion. Six positively changing indicators reflect attitudes to the area and crime. There is less evidence for net-change in relation to the three people-based outcomes, although there is considerable positive change with regard to mental health of which more later.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
As is mentioned earlier, the design of the evaluation means that two panels have been created: one consisting of those who lived in NDC, and one in comparator, areas for that period 2002 to 2008. One of the major advantages of panel data is that it is possible to model change in order to take into account individual-level socio-demographics notably age, gender and ethnicity. This is important in understanding real underlying trends. For instance, it is known that older people and women are more fearful of crime.
It may therefore be that unless these effects are taken into account, change data will reflect not real change but rather the fact that there are more (or fewer) women or older people in the sample. When individual-level modelling is undertaken for both panels, then only five core indicators show statistically significant change all of which show NDC panel members seeing more positive change than those who stayed in comparator areas.
Three of these relate to improved perceptions of the local place: thinking lawlessness and dereliction had improved; satisfaction with the area; and thinking the area had improved in the previous two years. The other two relate to health: a fall both in those who think their health is not good and also in those who consider their health had deteriorated in the previous year.
Discussion
They key headline finding from data outlined above is that, however the evidence is cut, change is relatively modest. A number of caveats need to be made. Although direct comparisons are fraught with problems, this rate of change is apparently not out of line with that occurring in other English
ABIs such as the Single Regeneration Budget (Rhodes et al, 2005) or EU schemes such as URBAN (Carpenter, 2006) . It is important too to emphasise that it may take many years for the full effects of NDC sponsored projects to become evident (Atkinson et al, 2006) . Nevertheless, on the broad canvas it would be hard to argue that these areas, or those residing This depth of data helps explain the nature of change. To give one example.
As is outlined in Table 2 One key finding from this evaluation is that it is easier to effect positive change in relation to place than to people. It is relatively straightforward to introduce initiatives which help people be more positive about their area and the local environment. Innovations such as environmental improvement schemes, neighbourhood management programmes, more police or community police support officers can all help move local resident from being-say-'very' to 'quite' dissatisfied with the area, the environment and so on. For many people-based outcomes the transition is more difficult to achieve. The classic example here is getting someone to move from being workless to being in a job. That is a major transition for many individuals to make. In practice NDC funded worklessness initiatives such as training programmes, job mentoring schemes and Information, Advice and Guidance projects, may well help move individuals along that trajectory towards a job.
But the ultimate outcome is about moving someone into employment. This is a much harder objective to achieve than, for instance, instilling a more positive attitude amongst local residents towards their local area. It is just harder to achieve people-based outcomes.
Even if individuals do achieve desired outcomes, it is then more difficult to identify these gains through top-down data collection exercises such as 
(ii) Outcomes and mobility
There can be an assumption that areas as deprived as NDCs will always suffer from the dynamics of mobility: those gaining from regeneration schemes leave to be replaced by relatively more deprived people, thus making it difficult for regeneration bodies to sustain positive change over time. If this were the case, it would have important methodological implications in that benefits attributable to the Programme would be 'lost'.
However, evidence from this evaluation casts doubt on these assumptions.
Those moving into NDC areas, a process driven in part by migration from EU Accession states, were often less disadvantaged than existing residents as opposed to a comparator, area. Having said that there was evidence of statistically significant better rates of change for those in NDC areas with regard to one place-based indicator: satisfaction with the area. Nevertheless, change for individuals is not generally associated with whether they live in a regeneration area, but rather is rooted in who they are and how deprived they were at the outset. Regeneration schemes are not going to make a huge difference to individual-level rates of change.
In the light of evidence presented in this section, there have to be doubts as to whether any ABI could ever lead to the sorts of change originally assumed of this Programme. Despite early rhetoric, resources were actually quite limited; only a small minority of people directly engaged in NDC projects; and change is overwhelmingly driven by who people are, not by where they live. And all of this within a context, as others have commented,
where there are fundamental questions surrounding the degree to which 22 positive change can anyway be effected at the local level (Ball and Maginn, 2004) . Problems may well be manifest at the neighbourhood level but require policy interventions at wider spatial scales. There remains that dilemma central to all area regeneration interventions, and which has been debated for more than forty years: problems may be apparent within, but are not of, areas.
A Concluding Comment: 'locating' the NDC Programme
Debates explored immediately above suggest that change was relatively modest across the 39 NDC areas, although there are important caveats to add to this headline finding such as the fact that it is difficult to isolate people-based gains occurring to relatively small numbers of project beneficiaries, and the importance of stressing the essentially limited nature of additional regeneration resources going into these areas. In this final brief section, these findings are used to 'validate' various debates about how best conceptually to 'locate' ABIs, one of which perspectives has greater purchase on the NDC experience than others.
Observers have in the recent past looked to social pathology arguments (Murray, 1990) , 'blaming' residents for their deprivation. Although these arguments retain little credibility, some commentators nevertheless see vestiges of social pathology thinking embedded in urban policy affected by the 1997-2010 Labour government (Cochrane, 2007) . However, the idea that communities could somehow be 'blamed' for their predicament was never an argument used explicitly by NDC Partnerships or indeed by government. Ten year strategies produced by NDC Partnerships consistently pointed to the insidious impact of 'structural' problems, notably declining and changing labour markets impacting on these areas over many years (DCLG, 2008a) . A variant of this argument suggests that ABIs may seek to impose physical solutions, notably a restructuring of housing markets, to address complex socio-economic problems. Housing played an intriguing role in the evolution of the Programme. It did not figure at first, the emphasis being placed on the social, economic, and environmental renewal of these areas. It was rapidly inserted into outcomes to be adopted by Notions that regeneration policy can be equated with the gentrification of deprived areas, have little purchase on this narrative.
It has also been argued that, after the election of the 1997 Labour government, the 'community' came to be given a more prominent role in initiatives such as the NDC Programme (Hill, 2000) . When launched ministers apparently told local residents that this was 'your money'. One narrative central to the Programme is, however, the steady retreat from that position. Through time government instigated a series of measures designed to channel, and it could be argued, de-radicalise, more challenging proposals from Partnerships. More than 40 Programme Notes were produced by central government to guide, and in some cases impose, processes on Partnerships. Annual plans were subject to approval by Government Offices for the Regions and ultimately central government. A performance management framework was developed designed to make Partnerships prioritise delivery and ensuring the spending of annual financial allocations.
In any event, the need to engage with other delivery agencies ensured that the vast majority of NDC funded projects were relatively routine: other delivery agencies were not going to use their resources to support untried, and potentially troublesome, initiatives. Community involvement in this ABI was probably greater than in previous regeneration schemes. But it would be wrong to see the programme as an embodiment of 'community empowerment'.
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A further perspective is based on relationships between ABIs, such as the NDC Programme, and wider socio-economic, 'structural', forces. Some would argue that area programmes have inherent advantages to governments. They can suggest that, although mainstream services and markets are operating 'normally', there are exceptional problems in certain localities (Cochrane, 2007) . ABIs make it possible for governments to seen to be doing something by instigating relatively cheap initiatives through which to moderate problems outside the norm, whilst avoiding more complex narratives linking deprived areas into wider policy and market forces (Atkinson, 2000) . Perspectives which see area policy as a veil behind which to hide the impact of wider structural forces have implications for all ABIs including the NDC Programme. Certainly in the early years, central government was happy to 'localise' the Programme, not wishing NDCs to engage with agencies other than those with a neighbourhood level remit.
But 'conspiratorial' theses have only limited purchase on this story. The
Programme was essentially designed as a laboratory to see what would happen in a relatively small number of deprived neighbourhoods, positive experience from which could then be rolled out elsewhere. There was never any suggestion that the Programme could address wider structural forces.
Instead it was part of a raft of 'New Deal' initiatives. Many of these were labour market programmes operating throughout the country and which were designed to address structural issues. The NDC Programme, on the other hand, was explicitly about seeing what could be done in deprived areas by pooling regeneration and mainstream resources to achieve ten year holistic, 'place-bound', strategies.
If the perspectives outlined above have relatively limited resonance for the NDC experience, one more 'pragmatic' interpretation seems altogether more appropriate bearing in mind the rate and nature of change alluded to earlier.
The NDC Programme can be seen as a form of 'locality managerialism' rooted in a centrally imposed framework designed to re-embed deprived 
